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Wireless Information-Theoretic Security
— Part I: Theoretical Aspects
Matthieu Bloch, Joa˜o Barros, Miguel R. D. Rodrigues, and Steven W. McLaughlin
Abstract
In this two-part paper, we consider the transmission of confidential data over wireless wiretap
channels. The first part presents an information-theoretic problem formulation in which two legitimate
partners communicate over a quasi-static fading channel and an eavesdropper observes their transmissions
through another independent quasi-static fading channel. We define the secrecy capacity in terms of
outage probability and provide a complete characterization of the maximum transmission rate at which
the eavesdropper is unable to decode any information. In sharp contrast with known results for Gaussian
wiretap channels (without feedback), our contribution shows that in the presence of fading information-
theoretic security is achievable even when the eavesdropper has a better average signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) than the legitimate receiver — fading thus turns out to be a friend and not a foe. The issue of
imperfect channel state information is also addressed. Practical schemes for wireless information-theoretic
security are presented in Part II, which in some cases comes close to the secrecy capacity limits given
in this paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issues of privacy and security in wireless communication networks have taken on an increasingly
important role as these networks continue to flourish worldwide. Traditionally, security is viewed as an
independent feature addressed above the physical layer and all widely used cryptographic protocols (e.g.
RSA, AES etc) are designed and implemented assuming the physical layer has already been established
and is error free.
In contrast with this paradigm, there exist both theoretical and practical contributions that support the
potential of physical layer security ideas to significantly strengthen the security of digital communication
systems. The basic principle of information-theoretic security — widely accepted as the strictest notion
of security — calls for the combination of cryptographic schemes with channel coding techniques that
exploit the randomness of the communication channels to guarantee that the sent messages cannot be
decoded by a third party maliciously eavesdropping on the wireless medium (see Fig. 1).
The theoretical basis for this information-theoretic approach, which builds on Shannon’s notion of
perfect secrecy [4], was laid by Wyner [5] and later by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [6], who proved in seminal
papers that there exist channel codes guaranteeing both robustness to transmission errors and a prescribed
degree of data confidentiality.
A general setup for the so called wiretap channel is shown in Fig. 2. In the original version, proposed
by Wyner in [5], two legitimate users communicate over a main channel and an eavesdropper has access
Fig. 1. Example of a wireless network with potential eavesdropping. Terminals T1 and T2 communicate with a base station S
over a wireless medium (channels A and B). By listening to the transmissions of terminal T1 (through channel C), terminal T2
may acquire confidential information. If T1 wants to exchange a secret key or guarantee the confidentiality of its transmitted
data, it can exploit the physical properties of the wireless channel to secure the information by coding against Terminal T2.
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Fig. 2. In the wiretap channel problem, the goal of the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, is to communicate reliably over the
noisy main channel, while ensuring that an eavesdropper, say Eve, is unable to obtain any information from the outputs of the
wiretap channel.
to degraded versions of the channel outputs that reach the legitimate receiver. In [7] it was shown that if
both the main channel and the wiretap channel are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, and
the latter has less capacity than the former, the secrecy capacity (i.e. the maximum transmission rate at
which the eavesdropper is unable to decode any information) is equal to the difference between the two
channel capacities. Consequently, confidential communication is not possible unless the Gaussian main
channel has a better signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the Gaussian wiretap channel.
In the seventies and eighties, the impact of these works was limited, partly because practical wiretap
codes were not available, but mostly because due the fact that a strictly positive secrecy capacity in the
classical wiretap channel setup requires the legitimate sender and receiver to have some advantage (a
better SNR) over the attacker. Moreover, almost at the same time, Diffie and Hellman [8] published the
basic principles of public-key cryptography, which was to be adopted by nearly all contemporary security
schemes.
More recently, information-theoretic security witnessed a renaissance arguably due to the work of
Maurer [9], who proved that even when the legitimate users (say Alice and Bob) have a worse channel than
the eavesdropper (say Eve), it is possible for them to generate a secret key through public communication
over an insecure yet authenticated channel. In [10] Maurer and Wolf showed that a stronger (and
technically more convincing) secrecy condition for discrete memoryless channels yields the same secrecy
rates as the weaker condition in [5] and [6]. A key ingredient for secret key generation over noisy channels
is privacy amplification (see Bennett et al [11]), which provides Alice and Bob with the means to distill
perfectly secret symbols (e.g. a secret key) from a large set of only partially secret data. This general
approach is used and modified in Part II of this paper to develop efficient protocols for the Gaussian and
quasi-static fading wiretap channel.
In [12], Hero introduced space-time signal processing techniques for secure communication over
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wireless links. More recently, Parada and Blahut [13] considered the secrecy capacity of various degraded
fading channels. In a shorter prelude to some of the results in this paper [1], Barros and Rodrigues
provided the first characterization of the outage secrecy capacity of slow fading channels and showed
that in the presence of fading information-theoretic security is achievable even when the eavesdropper
has a better average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the legitimate receiver— without the need for
public communication over a feedback channel. The ergodic secrecy capacity of fading channels was
soon derived by Liang and Poor [14], and, independently, by Li et al. [15]. Power and rate allocation
schemes for secret communication over fading channels were presented by Gopala et al. in [16]. Secure
broadcasting over wireless channels is considered in [17].
Practical secrecy capacity-achieving codes for erasure channels were presented by Thangaraj et al.
in [18]. LDPC codes were also shown by Bloch et al. [19] to be useful tools for reconciliation of
correlated continuous random variables, with implications in quantum key distribution. A related scheme
was presented by Ye and Reznik in [20]. Experimental results supporting the possibility of information-
theoretic secret key agreement over wireless channels were reported by Imai et al in [21].
Secrecy systems with multiple users have also recently become an object of intense research. Csisza´r
and Narayan [22] presented the fundamental limits of secret key generation in multi-terminal setups.
Secret key constructions for this problem are reported by Ye and Narayan in [23]. A detailed study of
the multiple access channel with secrecy constraints between users was provided by Liang and Poor
in [24]. Liu et al presented results for the same problem in [25] and, investigated in [26] also broadcast
and interference channels with confidential messages. The Gaussian multiple access channel with an
eavesdropper was studied in [27].
A. Our Contributions
Motivated by the general problem of securing transmissions over wireless channels, we consider the
impact of fading on the secrecy capacity. Our contributions in Part I are as follows:
(a) an information-theoretic formulation of the problem of secure communication over wireless chan-
nels;
(b) a characterization of the secrecy capacity of single-antenna quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels
in terms of outage probability;
(c) a simple analysis of the impact of user location on the achievable level of secrecy;
(d) a rigorous comparison with the Gaussian wiretap channel evidencing the benefits of fading towards
achieving a higher level of security;
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(e) a mathematical characterization of the impact of imperfect CSI about the eavesdropper’s channel
on the secrecy capacity;
(f) a comparison between information-theoretic security techniques at the physical layer and classical
cryptographic methods at higher layers of the protocol stack.
Among the different conclusions to be drawn from our results perhaps the most striking one is that, in
the presence of fading, information-theoretic security is achievable even when the eavesdropper’s channel
has a better average SNR than the main channel.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, Section II provides an information-theoretic
formulation of the problem of secure communication over fading channels. Then, Section III analyzes
the secrecy capacity of a quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel in terms of outage probability. The
implications of channel state information are analyzed in Section IV. Finally, Section V compares classical
cryptographic methods with information-theoretic security for wireless channels, and Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. SECURE COMMUNICATION OVER QUASI-STATIC RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS
A. Wireless System Setup
Consider the wireless system setup depicted in Fig. 3. A legitimate user, say Alice, wants to send
messages to another user, say Bob. Alice encodes the message block wk into the codeword xn for
transmission over the channel (the main channel). Bob observes the output of a discrete-time Rayleigh
fading channel given by
yM(i) = hM (i)x(i) + nM (i),
where hM (i) is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero-mean and unit-
variance representing the main channel fading coefficient and nM (i) is a zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian noise random variable.
A third party (Eve) is also capable of eavesdropping Alice’s transmissions. In particular, Eve observes
the output of an independent discrete-time Rayleigh fading channel (the wiretap channel) given by
yW (i) = hW (i)x(i) + nW (i),
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where hW (i) denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero-mean and unit-
variance representing the wiretap channel fading coefficient and nW (i) denotes a zero-mean circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian noise random variable.
It is assumed that the channels’ input, the channels’ fading coefficients and the channels’ noises are
all independent. It is also assumed that both the main and the wiretap channels are quasi-static fading
channels, that is, the fading coefficients, albeit random, are constant during the transmission of an entire
codeword (hM (i) = hM ,∀i = 1, . . . , n and hW (i) = hW ,∀i = 1, . . . , n) and, moreover, independent
from codeword to codeword.
We take the average transmit power to be P , that is
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[|X(i)|2] ≤ P,
and the average noise power in the main and the wiretap channels to be NM and NW , respectively.
Consequently, the instantaneous SNR at Bob’s receiver is
γM (i) = P |hM (i)|2/NM = P |hM |2/NM = γM
and its average value is
γM (i) = P E
[|hM (i)|2] /NM = P E [|hM |2] /NM = γM .
Likewise, the instantaneous SNR at Eve’s receiver is
γW (i) = P |hW (i)|2/NW = P |hW |2/NW = γW
and its average value is
γW (i) = P E
[|hW (i)|2] /NW = P E [|hW |2] /NW = γW .
Since the channel fading coefficients h are zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables and the
instantaneous SNR γ ∝ |h|2, it follows that γ is exponentially distributed, specifically
p(γM ) =
1
γM
exp
(
−γM
γM
)
, γM > 0 (1)
and
p(γW ) =
1
γW
exp
(
−γW
γW
)
, γW > 0. (2)
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Fig. 3. Wireless system setup.
B. Problem Statement
Let the transmission rate between Alice and Bob be R = H(W k)/n, the equivocation rate1 or Eve’s
uncertainty be ∆ = H(W k|Y nW )/H(W k), and the error probability Pǫ = P(W k 6= Wˆ k), where W k
denotes the sent messages and Wˆ k denotes Bob’s estimate of the sent messages.
In general, one is interested in characterizing the rate-equivocation region, that is, the set of achievable
pairs (R′, d′). A pair (R′, d′) is achievable if for all ǫ > 0 there exists an encoder-decoder pair such that
R ≥ R′ − ǫ, ∆ ≥ d′ − ǫ, and Pǫ ≤ ǫ. Here, however, we are interested in characterizing the secrecy
capacity Cs, that is, the maximum transmission rate R at ∆ = 1.
In the rest of the paper, we will study the secrecy capacity of this wireless system for different
channel state information (CSI) regimes. We will always assume that Bob has perfect knowledge of the
main channel fading coefficient and that Eve also has perfect knowledge of the wiretap channel fading
coefficient 2. We will also always assume that Alice has perfect knowledge of the main channel fading
coefficient. Note that these assumptions are realistic for this slow fading wireless environment: both
receivers can always obtain close to perfect channel estimates and, additionally, the legitimate receiver
can also feedback the channel estimates to the legitimate transmitter. However, we will assume various
1Notice that the secrecy condition used here (and in [5], [7]) is weaker than the one proposed by Maurer and Wolf in [10], where
the information obtained by the eavesdropper is negligibly small not just in terms of rate but in absolute terms. Unfortunately,
it is unclear whether the techniques used for discrete memoryless channels in [10] can be extended for Gaussian channels, in
particular information reconciliation and privacy amplification. Resolving this issue is part of our ongoing efforts.
2By virtue of the independence of the main channel and the wiretap channel, there are no additional benefits/penalities if Bob
knows the wiretap fading coefficient and/or Eve knows the main channel fading coefficient
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regimes for Alice knowledge of the eavesdropper channel:
(a) No knowledge of the wiretap channel fading coefficient;
(b) Partial knowledge of the wiretap channel fading coefficient;
(c) Perfect knowledge of the wiretap channel fading coefficient.
Case 1 corresponds to the situation where Eve is a passive and malicious eavesdropper in the wireless
network. Cases 2 and 3 correspond to the situation where Eve is another active user in the wireless
network, so that, e.g. in a TDMA environment, Alice can estimate the wiretap channel during Eve
transmissions.
In the following sections, we will characterize the secrecy capacity in terms of outage events for the
wireless system setup in Fig. 3.
III. SECRECY CAPACITY AND OUTAGE WITHOUT CSI ON THE EAVESDROPPER’S CHANNEL
In this section, we will consider the situation where the legitimate transmitter (Alice) knows nothing
about the state of the eavesdropper’s channel. However, we assume that the legitimate transmitter and
receiver know the state of the main channel perfectly and that the eavesdropper also knows the state of
the eavesdropper channel perfectly (see Section II).
Consequently, this section characterizes the secrecy capacity of a quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel
in terms of outage probability. First, we consider a single realization of the fading coefficients and compute
its instantaneous secrecy capacity. Then, we discuss the existence of (strictly positive) secrecy capacity
in the general case, and build upon the resulting insights to characterize the outage probability and the
outage secrecy capacity.
A. Instantaneous Secrecy Capacity
We start by deriving the secrecy capacity for one realization of a pair of quasi-static fading channels
with complex noise and complex fading coefficients.
For this purpose, we recall the results of [7] for the real-valued Gaussian wiretap channel, where it is
assumed that Alice and Bob communicate over a standard real additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel with noise power NM and Eve’s observation is also corrupted by Gaussian noise with power
NW > NM , i.e. Eve’s receiver has lower SNR than Bob’s. The power is constrained according to
1
n
∑n
i=1 E
[
X(i)2
] ≤ P . For this instance, the secrecy capacity is given by
Cs = CM − CW , (3)
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where
CM =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
NM
)
is the capacity of the main channel and
CW =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
NW
)
denotes the capacity3 of the eavesdropper’s channel. From this result, we can derive the following lemma
which describes the instantaneous secrecy capacity for the wireless fading scenario defined in Section II.
Lemma 1: The secrecy capacity for one realization of the quasi-static complex fading wiretap-channel
is given by
Cs =

 log (1 + γM )− log (1 + γW ) if γM > γW0 if γM ≤ γW . (4)
Proof: Suppose that both the main and the wiretap channel are complex AWGN channels, i.e. trans-
mit and receive symbols are complex and both additive noise processes are zero mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian. The power of the complex input X is constrained according to 1
n
∑n
i=1 E
[|X(i)|2] ≤
P . Since each use of the complex AWGN channel can be viewed as two uses of a real-valued AWGN
channel [28, Appendix B], the secrecy capacity of the complex wiretap channel follows from (3) as
Cs = log
(
1 +
P
NM
)
− log
(
1 +
P
NW
)
,
per complex dimension4.
To complete the proof, we introduce complex fading coefficients for both the main channel and the
eavesdropper’s channel, as detailed in Section II. Since in the quasi-static case hM and hW are random
but remain constant for all time, it is perfectly reasonable to view the main channel (with fading) as a
complex AWGN channel [28, Chapter 5] with SNR γM = P |hM |2/NM and capacity
CM = log
(
1 + |hM |2 P
NM
)
.
Similarly, the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel is given by
CW = log
(
1 + |hW |2 P
NW
)
,
with SNR γW = P |hW |2/NW . Thus, once again based on (3) and the nonnegativity of channel capacity,
we may write the secrecy capacity for one realization of the quasi-static fading scenario as (4).
3Unless otherwise specified, all logarithms are taken to base two.
4Alternatively, this result can be proven by repeating step by step the proofs of [7] using complex-valued random variables
instead of real-valued ones.
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B. Probability of Strictly Positive Secrecy Capacity
We will now determine the probability P(Cs > 0) of a strictly positive secrecy capacity between Alice
and Bob.
Lemma 2: For average signal-to-noise ratios γM and γW on the main channel and the wiretap channel,
respectively, we have that
P(Cs > 0) = γM
γM + γW
. (5)
Proof: As explained in Section III-A, for specific fading realizations, the main channel (from Alice
to Bob) and the eavesdropper’s channel (from Alice to Eve) can be viewed as complex AWGN channels
with SNR γM and γW , respectively. Moreover, from (4) it follows that the secrecy capacity is positive
when γM > γW and is zero when γM ≤ γW . Invoking independence between the main channel and the
eavesdropper’s channel and knowing that the random variables γM and γW are exponentially distributed
with probability density functions given by (1) and (2), respectively, we may write the probability of
existence of a non-zero secrecy capacity as
P(Cs > 0) = P(γM > γW )
=
∫
∞
0
∫ γM
0
p(γM , γW )dγW dγM
=
∫
∞
0
∫ γM
0
p(γM )p(γW )dγW dγM
=
γM
γM + γW
.
It is also useful to express this probability in terms of parameters related to user location.
Corollary 1: For distance dM between Alice and Bob, distance dW between Alice and Eve, and
pathloss exponent α, we have that
P(Cs > 0) = 1
1 + (dM/dW )α
(6)
Proof: The corollary follows directly from the fact that γM ∝ 1/dαM and γW ∝ 1/dαW [29].
Remark 1: Note that when γM ≫ γW (or dM ≪ dW ) then P(Cs > 0) ≈ 1 (or P(Cs = 0) ≈ 0).
Conversely, when γW ≫ γM (or dW ≪ dM ) then P(Cs > 0) ≈ 0 (or P(Cs = 0) ≈ 1). It is also
interesting to observe that to guarantee the existence of a non-zero secrecy capacity with probability
greater than p0 then it follows from (5) and (6) that
γM
γW
>
p0
1− p0
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or
dM
dW
< α
√
1− p0
p0
.
In particular, a non-zero secrecy capacity exists even when γM < γW or dM > dW , albeit with probability
less than 1/2.
C. Outage Probability of Secrecy Capacity
We are now ready to characterize the outage probability
Pout(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs),
i.e. the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is less than a target secrecy rate Rs > 0. The
operational significance of this definition of outage probability is that when setting the secrecy rate Rs
Alice is assuming that the capacity of the wiretap channel is given by C ′W = CM − Rs. As long as
Rs < Cs, Eve’s channel will be worse than Alice’s estimate, i.e. CW < C ′W , and so the wiretap codes used
by Alice will ensure perfect secrecy. Otherwise, if Rs > Cs then CW > C ′W and information-theoretic
security is compromised.
Theorem 1: The outage probability for a target secrecy rate Rs is given by
Pout(Rs) = 1− γM
γM + 2
RsγW
exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γM
)
. (7)
Proof: Invoking the total probability theorem,
Pout(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs | γM > γW )P(γM > γW )
+P(Cs < Rs | γM ≤ γW )P(γM ≤ γW )
Now, from (5) we know that
P(γM > γW ) = γM
γM + γW
.
Consequently, we have
P(γM ≤ γW ) = 1− P(γM > γW ) = γW
γM + γW
.
On the other hand, we also have that
P(Cs < Rs | γM > γW )
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= P(log(1 + γM )− log(1 + γW ) < Rs | γM > γW )
= P(γM < 2Rs(1 + γW )− 1 | γM > γW )
=
∫
∞
0
∫ 2Rs(1+γW )−1
γW
p(γM , γW | γM > γW )dγW dγM
=
∫
∞
0
∫ 2Rs(1+γW )−1
γW
p(γM )p(γW )
P(γM > γW )dγW dγM
= 1− γM + γW
γM + 2
RsγW
exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γM
)
and, since Rs > 0,
P(Cs < Rs | γM ≤ γW ) = 1.
Combining the previous five equations, we get
Pout(Rs) = 1− γM
γM + 2
RsγW
exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γM
)
. (8)
D. Outage Secrecy Capacity
Another performance measure of interest is the ǫ-outage secrecy capacity, defined as the largest secrecy
rate such that the outage probability is less than ǫ, i.e.
Pout(Cout(ǫ)) = ǫ .
Although it is hard to obtain the outage secrecy capacity analytically — the outage probability is a
complicated function of the secrecy rate — it is possible to compute its value numerically based on (7).
E. Asymptotic Behavior
It is illustrative to examine the asymptotic behavior of the outage probability for extreme values of the
target secrecy rate Rs. From (7) it follows that when Rs → 0,
Pout → γW
γM + γW
and when Rs → ∞, we have that Pout → 1, such that it becomes impossible for Alice and Bob to
transmit secret information (at very high rates).
Also of interest is the asymptotic behavior of the outage probability for extreme values of the average
SNRs of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel. When γM ≫ γW , equation (7) yields
Pout(Rs) ≈ 1− exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γM
)
,
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and in a high SNR regime Pout ≈ (2Rs−1)/γM , i.e. the outage probability decays as 1/γM . Conversely,
when γW ≫ γM ,
Pout(Rs) ≈ 1,
and confidential communication becomes impossible.
Fig. 4 depicts the outage probability versus γM , for selected values of γW and for a normalized target
secrecy rate equal to 0.1. Observe that the higher γM the lower the outage probability, and the higher
γW the higher the probability of an outage. Moreover, if γM ≫ γW , the outage probability decays as
1/γM . Conversely, if γW ≫ γM the outage probability approaches one.
With respect to the asymptotic behavior of the outage secrecy capacity, it is not difficult to see that
Cout → 0 yields Pout → γW /(γM + γW ), and when Cout →∞, we have Pout → 1.
The impact of the distance ratio on the performance is illustrated in Fig. 5, which depicts the outage
probability versus dW /dM , for selected values of γM and for a normalized target secrecy rate equal
to 0.1. The pathloss exponent is set to be equal to a typical value of 3 [29]. When dW /dM → ∞ (or
γM/γW →∞), we have that Pout → 1− exp(−(2Rs − 1)/γM ). If dW /dM → 0 (or γM/γW → 0), then
Pout → 1.
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F. Fading Channels versus Gaussian Channels
It is important to emphasize that under a fading scenario — in contrast with the Gaussian wiretap
channel [7]— the goal of a strictly positive (outage) secrecy capacity does not require the average SNR
of the main channel to be greater than the average SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel. This is due
to the fact that in the presence of fading there is always a finite probability, however small, that the
instantaneous SNR of the main channel γM is higher than the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper’s
channel γW .
Specifically, the results in Section III demonstrate that a non-zero outage secrecy capacity requires
γM > γW for Pout < 0.5, but we may have γM < γW for Pout > 0.5. In other words, if we are willing
to tolerate some outage, then there is no obstacle to information-theoretic security over wireless fading
channels. In fact, it is possible to trade off outage probability for outage secrecy capacity: a higher outage
secrecy capacity corresponds to a higher outage probability, and vice versa.
It also turns out that the outage secrecy capacity of a fading channel can actually be higher than the
secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel. Consider the examples shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7,
which depict the normalized outage secrecy capacity versus γM , for selected values of γW , and for an
outage probability of 0.1 and 0.75, respectively. The normalized secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap
channel with main channel SNR equal to γM and wiretap channel SNR equal to γW is also included for
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Fig. 5. Outage probability versus dW /dM , for selected values of γM and for a normalized target secrecy rate equal to 0.1.
Normalization is effected with respect to the capacity of an AWGN channel with SNR equal to γ
M
.
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comparison. Observe that in the Gaussian case the secrecy capacity is zero when γM ≤ γW . In contrast,
in the case of Rayleigh fading channels the outage secrecy capacity is non-zero even when γM ≤ γW (as
long as Pout > 0.5). More importantly, the outage secrecy capacity in the Rayleigh fading case exceeds the
secrecy capacity of the equivalent Gaussian wiretap channel, for higher outage probabilities. These key
observations are also corroborated by Fig. 8, which compares the normalized (outage) secrecy capacity
for fading channels to the secrecy capacity of Gaussian channels, for various outage probabilities.
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.
Finally, it is also interesting to examine the average secrecy rate given by
R¯s = (1− Pout(Rs)) · Rs
The average secrecy rate R¯s is a function of Alice’s target instantaneous secrecy rate Rs, so that Alice is
in principle able to optimize the target instantaneous secrecy rate to maximize the average secrecy rate
(see Fig. 9). Fig. 10 compares the optimum average secrecy rate in the case of Rayleigh fading channels
to the secrecy capacity of AWGN channels. It is interesting to observe once again that there is a positive
secrecy rate in a Rayleight fading channel even when the average SNR in the main channel is lower than
that in the eavesdropper channel.
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of an AWGN channel with SNR equal to γ
M
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS WITH PERFECT AND IMPERFECT CSI ON THE EAVESDROPPER’S
CHANNEL
In this section, we move from the paradigm where the legitimate transmitter (Alice) knows nothing
about the state of the eavesdropper’s channel to one where Alice knows the state of the eavesdropper’s
channel partially or even perfectly. However, we still assume that the legitimate transmitter and receiver
know the state of the main channel perfectly and that the eavesdropper also knows the state of the
eavesdropper channel perfectly (see Section II).
We model Alice’s estimate of Bob’s channel as
hˆM = hM ,
where hˆM is the estimate fading coefficient of the main channel and hM is the true fading coefficient of
the main channel. Thus, the estimate main channel instantaneous SNR is equal to the true main channel
instantaneous SNR, that is
γˆM = γM .
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secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel (in the last two cases this capacity is zero). Normalization is effected with
respect to the capacity of an AWGN channel with SNR equal to γ
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.
We also model Alice’s estimate of Eve’s channel as
hˆW = hW + δW ,
where hˆW is the estimate fading coefficient of the wiretap channel, hW is the true fading coefficient of
the wiretap channel and δW is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with mean zero
and variance σ2 per dimension. Thus, the true value and the estimate of wiretap channel instantaneous
SNR may be different, that is
γˆW 6= γW .
In this new scenario, we will assume that Alice always sets the instantaneous information transmission
rate Rs to be equal to the instantaneous secrecy capacity estimate Cˆs of the channel where
Cˆs =

 CˆM − CˆW if CˆM ≥ CˆW0 if CˆM < CˆW
and CˆM = log(1 + γˆM ) is the instantaneous main channel capacity estimate and CˆW = log(1 + γˆW ) is
the instantaneous wiretap channel capacity estimate. We will now characterize the fundamental secrecy
limits when Alice knows the state of the eavesdropper’s channel both imperfectly and perfectly, including
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the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel (in the last two cases this capacity is zero). Normalization is effected with
respect to the capacity of an AWGN channel with SNR equal to γ
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.
the probability of a secrecy outage, the average secure throughput (from Alice to Bob) and the average
leaked throughput (from Alice to Eve).
A. Imperfect Knowledge of CSI of Eavesdropper’s Channel
In this situation, Alice conveys information to Bob at a rate Rs = Cˆs using a wiretap code designed
for the operating point (CˆM , CˆW ) = (CM , CˆW ), when CˆM > CˆW . If CˆW > CW (i.e., Cˆs < Cs)
transmission in perfect secrecy is guaranteed, that is, a secrecy outage does not occur. Otherwise, if
CˆW < CW (i.e., Cˆs > Cs) transmission in perfect secrecy cannot be guaranteed, that is, a secrecy outage
occurs. It is now relevant to characterize the probability of a secrecy outage.
Theorem 2: The probability of a secrecy outage is upper bounded by
Pout ≤ 1
2
− 1
2
1√
1 + 2/σ2
. (9)
Proof: The probability of a secrecy outage is given by
Pout = P(CˆW < CM , CˆW < CW ) = P(γˆW < γM , γˆW < γW ) = P(γˆW < min(γM , γW ))
Consequently, the probability of a secrecy outage is upper bounded by
Pout = P(γˆW < min(γM , γW )) ≤ P(γˆW < γW )
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Now, P(γˆW < γW ) can be written as follows
P(γˆW < γW ) =
∫
∞
0
P(γˆW < γW |γW )p(γW )dγW
where p(γW ) is the probability density function of γW (see (2)). Moreover, P(γˆW < γW |γW ) can also
be written as follows
P(γˆW < γW |γW ) =
∫ γW
0
p(γˆW |γW )dγW
where p(γˆW |γW ) is the probability density function of γˆW conditioned on γW . This probability density
function is non-central χ2 with two degrees of freedom, i.e.
p(γˆW |γW ) = 1
2γ¯Wσ2
e
−
(γW +γˆW )
2γ¯W σ
2 I0
(√
γW γˆW
γ¯Wσ2
)
, γˆW > 0
where I0(·) is the zeroth-order modified Bessel function of the first kind [30]. Thus, the probability
P(γˆW < γW |γW ) reduces to
P(γˆW < γW |γW ) = 1−Q1
(√
γW/(γ¯Wσ2),
√
γW /(γ¯Wσ2)
)
where Q1(·, ·) is the generalized Marcum Q function [30]. Moreover, using standard results for integrals
involving the generalized Marcum Q function [31], the upper bound to the outage probability reduces to
Pout ≤ 1
2
− 1
2
1√
1 + 2/σ2
. (10)
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It is also relevant to characterize two other quantities with operational significance: the average secure
throughput (or average secrecy rate) and the average leaked throughput. These quantities correspond
to the average of the instantaneous secure throughput and the instantaneous leaked throughput over
every possible realization of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel. Now, the average secure
throughput is lower bounded by the average of the transmission rate over instances where the secrecy
capacity estimate is lower than the true secrecy capacity, i.e.
R¯s ≥
∫
∞
0
Cˆs p(Cˆs|Cˆs < Cs) dCˆs
In turn, the average leaked throughput is upper bounded by the average of the transmission rate over
instances where the secrecy capacity estimate is higher than the true secrecy capacity, i.e.
R¯l ≤
∫
∞
0
Cˆs p(Cˆs|Cˆs > Cs) dCˆs
These quantities will be characterized numerically due to the difficulty in determining closed-form
expressions.
A number of comments on the behavior of the various performance measures are now in order. Fig. 11
shows that the upper bound to the outage probability is considerably tight in a regime where the average
SNR of the main channel is greater than the average SNR of the eavesdropper channel. More importantly,
the outage probability is a monotone decreasing function of the variance of the channel estimation error,
so that for σ2 > 0 the higher the variance of the channel estimation errors the lower the outage probability.
This counterintuitive result is based on the fact that for moderate values of the variance of the
channel estimation error Alice tends to consistently underestimate the secrecy capacity of the system.
Consequently, the attempted instantaneous transmission rate is consistently lower than the instantaneous
secrecy capacity so that the outage probability is also lower. This in turn results in a lower average secure
throughput and a lower average leaked throughput as shown in Fig. 12 and Fig. 13.
Yet, of extreme relevance is the fact that even in the presence of channel estimation errors it is possible
to convey information in a secure manner over a wireless environment (that is, with an average secure
throughput substantially greater than the average leaked throughput) provided now that the average SNR
of the main channel is greater than the average SNR of the eavesdropper channel (cf. Fig. 12 and Fig. 13).
B. Perfect Knowledge of CSI of Eavesdropper’s Channel
In this situation, Alice conveys information to Bob at a rate Rs = Cˆs = Cs using a wiretap code
designed for the operating point (CˆM , CˆW ) = (CM , CW ), so that a secrecy outage never occurs. It
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follows that the average secure throughput (average secrecy rate) is
R¯s =
∫
∞
0
RsdFCs(Rs),
where 5
FCs(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs) = 1−
γ¯M
γ¯M + 2Rs γ¯W
e
2Rs−1
γ¯M ,
and the average leaked throughput is zero.
Fig. 14 compares the average secrecy rate in a ”wiretap” Rayleigh fading channel to the secrecy
capacity in the classic wiretap Gaussian channel. Strikingly, one observes that the average secrecy rate in
the fading channel is indeed higher than or close to the secrecy capacity in the Gaussian channel. One also
observes that, in contrast to the situation in the Gaussian channel, the average secrecy rate in the fading
channel is non-zero even when the average SNR of the main channel is lower than the average SNR of
the eavesdropper channel. These observations underline once again the potential of fading channels to
secure the transmission of information between two legitimate parties against a possible eavesdropper.
5Note that the expression for the cumulative distribution function of the instantaneous secrecy capacity is exactly the same
as the expression for the outage probability in (7).
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V. INFORMATION-THEORETIC VS. COMPUTATIONAL SECURITY IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
Due to the many fundamental differences between classical cryptography and information-theoretic
security, it is useful to recognize what those differences are and how they affect the choice of technology
in a wireless scenario. It is fair to state that classical cryptographic security under the computational
model offers the following advantages:
• there are so far no publicly-known, efficient attacks on public-key systems such as RSA, and hence
they are deemed secure for a large number of applications;
• very few assumptions are made about the plaintext to be encoded, and security is provided on a
block-to-block basis, meaning as long as the cryptographic primitive is secure, then every encoded
block is secure;
• Systems are widely deployed, technology is readily available and inexpensive.
On the other hand, we must consider also the following disadvantages of the computational model:
• Security is based on unproven assumptions regarding the hardness of certain one-way functions.
Plaintext is insecure if assumptions are wrong or if efficient attacks are developed;
• In general there are no precise metrics or absolute comparisons between various cryptographic
primitives that show the trade off between reliability and security as a function of the block length
of plaintext and ciphertext messages - in general, the security of the cryptographic protocol is
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.
measured by whether it survives a set of attacks or not;
• In general, these will not be information theoretically secure if the communication channel between
friendly parties and the eavesdropper are noiseless, because the secrecy capacity of these application-
layer systems is zero;
• State-of-the art key distribution schemes for wireless networks based on the computational model
require a trusted third party as well as complex protocols and system architectures [32].
The advantages of physical layer security under the information-theoretic (perfect) security models can
be summarized as follows:
• No computational restrictions are placed on the eavesdropper;
• Very precise statements can be made about the information that is leaked to the eavesdropper as a
function of channel quality and blocklength of the messages [11];
• Has been realized in practice through quantum key distribution [33];
• In theory, suitably long codes used for privacy amplification can get exponentially close to perfect
secrecy [11];
• Instead of distributing keys it is possible to generate on-the-fly as many secret keys as desired.
In contrast, we have to take into consideration the following disadvantages of information-theoretic
security:
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• Information-theoretic security is an average-information measure. The system can be designed and
tuned for a specific level of security - e.g. with very high probability a block will be secure, but it
may not be able to guarantee security with probability 1;
• Requires assumptions about the communication channels that may not be accurate in practice. In
many cases one would make very conservative assumptions about the channels. This will likely result
in low secrecy capacities and low secret-key or -message exchange rates. This gives extremely high
security and reliability, but at low communication rates;
• A few systems (e.g Quantum Key Distribution) are deployed but the technology is not as widely
available and is expensive;
• A short secret key is still required for authentication [9].
In light of the brief comparisons above, it is likely that any deployment of a physical-layer security
protocol in a classical system would be part of a ”layered security” solution where security is provided at
a number of different layers, each with a specific goal in mind. This modular approach is how virtually
all systems are designed today, so in this context, physical-layer security provides an additional layer of
security that does not exist today in classical systems.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We provided a preliminary characterization of the outage secrecy capacity of wireless channels with
quasi-static fading. Specifically, we assumed that Alice — having access to the CSI of the main channel
only — chooses a target secrecy rate Rs (without knowing the wiretap channel) and we investigated the
outage probability defined as P(Rs > Cs). Our results reveal that (a) perfectly secure communication over
wireless channels is possible even when the eavesdropper has a better average SNR than the legitimate
partners, and (b) the outage secrecy capacity of wireless channels can actually be higher than the secrecy
capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel with the same averaged SNRs γM and γW . Furthermore, we
analyzed the impact of imperfect channel state information on the outage probability and the outage
secrecy capacity. In particular, we have demonstrated that even in the presence of imperfect CSI it is
possible to convey information in an almost secure manner, that is, with an average secure throughput
substantially greater than the average leaked throughput.
Suppose now that Alice has access to CSI on both the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel.
This is the case, for example in a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) environment, when Eve is
not a covert eavesdropper, but simply another user interacting with the wireless network, thus sending
communication signals that allow Alice to estimate the CSI of the channel between them. A natural
way for Alice to exploit the available CSI on both channels to achieve secrecy is by transmitting useful
symbols to Bob only when the instantaneous SNR values are such that the instantaneous secrecy capacity
is strictly positive (γM > γW ).
This observation thus suggests an opportunistic secret key agreement scheme for wireless networks
— even when the outage probability is very high, the available secrecy capacity is still likely to enable
Alice and Bob to generate an (information-theoretically secured) encryption key that could then be used
to secure the data exchange while the system is in outage of secrecy capacity. Implementing such a
scheme is the goal of Part II of this paper.
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